Abstract
Introduction
In 2010, the British government began declassifying documents related to the Falklands crisis (1982) . These documents are now available on the Margaret Thatcher Foundation website. They are related to the negotiations with Argentina and cover the crucial period [1979] [1980] [1981] [1982] , when the situation spiraled out of control and ended up in a military conflict. These documents are largely comprised of reports from the cabinet's internal discussions as well as communications from the Falklands' governor. They offer a great deal of information on how the British government perceived the Falklands issue; they also provide information on how the island's residents perceived their situation and also the pivotal role of Argentinean public opinion.
It is important to analyze these newly declassified documents to confirm the relevance of previously applied theories to explain why negotiations failed and war ensued 32 years after the fact. The Falklands crisis also had other consequences that still stand today: the islands' sovereignty continues to be an important issue for Argentina and the United Kingdom to such an extent that the UK organized a referendum in 2012 to ask the islanders if they wanted to remain British. The result was 99.8% in favor of a British citizenship (Falkland Islands Government 2013) . As soon as the results were revealed, Buenos Aires qualified it as illegal and argued that the islands belong to Argentina. London has permanently deployed fighter squadrons to ensure air superiority in that region and to -de facto -deter Argentina from invading the islands again. The aim of this article is not to explain the conflict itself, but rather to provide an explanatory model as to why Britain decided to risk its entire navy and international prestige to re-conquer remote islands in the South Atlantic.
Literature review
Many books and articles are dedicated to the Falklands crisis. This abundant literature can be divided into three major categories.
(1) The first is made up of works from decision-makers involved in the conflict (Thatcher 1993; Haig 1984; Weinberger 1990; Costa Méndez 1993; Menéndez 1983) and from officers and soldiers who were deployed on the battlefield (Woodward 1992; Thompson 1992; Piaggi 1998; Bramley 1993; Lawrence and Lawrence 1988) .
(2) The second category in the literature is composed of historical works. A part of this cohort describes and presents the conduct of the war and of military operations (Adkin 1995; Gordon 1989; Middlebrook 1985 and Schmitt and Green 1985; Calvert 1982; Hastings and Jenkins 1983) .
Another part focuses on describing the value proposition bargain from a factual point of view and how the crisis was (mis) managed by the two sides, but with very little convincing theoretical evidence developed (Freedman 1982 and 1988; Williams 1983) . Douglas Kinney also takes this perspective but offers an explanation as to why the two sides couldn't find any peaceful resolution to the dispute prior to the conflict. His argument is that no agreement was reached due to the view of the world the two countries had and their lack of imagination in finding a mutually facesaving compromise. In addition, there are studies about the legal aspects of the conflict in relation to international law (Calvert 1983; Windsor 1983; Schmitt and Green 1985; Franck 1983; Bluth 1987; Perl and Larson 1983) .
(3) The third category is composed of academic works. Most of them concentrate on explaining the Argentine decision to invade the Falklands (Welch 1997 and . The most common argument is the diversionary theory of war: Jack Levy and Lily Vakili (1992) highlight the impact and decisive importance that the Argentine domestic and social situation had on the Junta and on its desire to recover the island to salvage its political leadership.
1 Other scholars defend the idea of mutual misperceptions (Paul 1994; Rotberg and Rubb 1984) . However, there are very few studies that explain the Falklands conflict from the British side. One of the most notable works is that of Virginia Gamba (1987) but unfortunately, her work presents more the general international and political context in which Britain was from 1945 to 1982 and not the actual British motivation to go to war. The most widely accepted theoretical argument is that Thatcher took the decision to re-conquer the Falklands in order to save her political 1 To go to war to distract domestic opinion from domestic shifts in order to gain public support and ultimately win the next elections (Sobek 2007 ).
career and shift the focus away from her domestic policies. With only access to the conflict timelines and studies of the British domestic context, the argument of diversionary war appears to be relevant and tempting to accept. However, a detailed study of declassified documents proves that both Thatcher and her government were not particularly concerned by the outcome of the next elections when they took the decision to send the entire Royal Navy on 5 April.
Other IR scholars, particularly Richard Ned Lebow (1983) 
Great power status and its implications
Defining great power and great power status
The term "great power" was first used in 1815 during the Vienna Congress to name states having the responsibility to create and sustain international rules (Nolan 2006: 72) . Since 1815, the terminology of "great power"
is often used in IR to name the most important and powerful countries.
When it comes to providing criteria to identify great powers, there is a strong tendency use only material criteria, such as economic and military power: "a great power, almost by definition, is one which has the capacity to control events beyond its own borders; and that is usually based on the ability to use military force" (Howard 1971: 254; Rothstein 1968; Levy 1983; Modelski and Morgan 1985; Gochman and Maoz 1984; Baron 2013; Mearsheimer 2014 ). However, this understanding is too limited: focusing on military power and economic power, although important, is not enough (Duque 2015). To give a more accurate definition of what a great power is, identification criteria should rather be based on the three types of power identified by Robert Dahl (1957) , Steven Lukes (1974), and Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall (2005) . These three aspects of power can be found in Manjeet Pardesi's recent works. In his article "Is India a Great power?
Understanding Great Power status" (2015), he explains that great powers are countries having security and economic related interests outside of the home region, that they have capabilities to promote their interests and that finally they have seen their aspirations to be considered as great powers recognised. Based on this, it seems to be more accurate to define a great power as a state possessing the five following characteristics:
(1) having interests (economic, strategic, diplomatic or cultural) in other region(s) than its home region and being able to prevent other actors from following policies harmful to its interests or to compel others to bow to some extend to its interests; (2) then a great power is also a country having both the resolve and capabilities to be active on the international stage (promoting initiatives, imposing norms/rules of conduct, controlling the agenda and taking the lead to find solutions to global issues Status can be defined as "the rank an actor occupies in a given social group" (Onea 2014: 129) and has at its core the notion of social groups' consensus about the position an actor has in a given hierarchy (Dafoe, Rensthen and Huth 2014) . "Status often hold 'social roles', such as being dominant within a group, having moral authority within a group, being the leader of a coalition, or being the defender of a group of people" (Dafoe et al. 2014: 374) . A given position in a hierarchy has prescribed duties, functions to be performed, and rights to be enjoyed. Great power status is a very particular type of status, because it goes along with expected higher task performances and a better ability to resolve regional and international issues (Forsberg, Heller and Wolf 2014: 263-264 2006: 74) . This first task has been gradually extended to the preservation of the actual order: that is to say preventing physical aggression (Morris 2011 ) but also preventing (and punishing) aggression in contravention of international law (Jackson 2000: 202) . In exchange for responsibilities at the global stage and status, great powers must prove their commitment to fulfil these expectations, even if it is costly (Bukovansky et al. 2012; Nolan 2006) . Great power status provides privileges: states enjoying it cannot be ignored in resolving international issues and when it comes to negotiating agreements, the supposed gap of power between the great power and its counter-parts makes the weaker actor agree to the great power's terms (Aron 1962: 68) . More generally, "the group is more reticent to impose, it makes requests more carefully, and it offers various public signs of respect" (O'Neill 2001: 139) . Claimed status has to be recognised by others to be fully enjoyed. The recognition process is therefore a two-step process: self-recognition and then recognition by others. In this process I identify three components, called the 'three circles of recognition'.
Attaining and retaining great power status: a Sisyphean task
The three step process to earning great power status
When a country consistently fulfils the great powers' criteria elaborated above, its leaders/ruling elites and its citizens start to believe their country is special; and because their country is special, they should be considered differently from other countries. A feeling of superiority, or at least an impression of being different from and unique compared to others enhances national self-esteem. There are two clearly defined groups of states: all the others and their country. To ordinary people as well as to ruling elites, it is unthinkable that their country could be anything less than a great power. The great power status recognition starts, therefore, by self-recognition/attribution of this particular status. This step is essential.
If leaders/ruling elites are not convinced their country is a great power, how could they ask others to grant them this status? To make use of a comparison from theatre: an actor needs to believe he is the character he will be playing during the theatre play. If the actor is not persuaded he is indeed the character he will be playing, then the audience will notice and refuse to acknowledge that it is anything more than a theatre play. The insistence that their country should be seen as a great power and granted privileges and prestige linked to that position becomes a key element of a state's foreign policy until full international recognition occurs (Forsberg, Heller and Wolf 2014: 262) . Self-attribution of status is, of course, necessary in the quest for this status, but it is not sufficient. What is lacking is being recognised by others. The state needs the approval of others to achieve status. They are used by the state as a mirror on which its image is reflected: "social status rests on collective judgment, or rather a consensus of opinion within a group. No one can by himself confer status on another, and if a man's social position were assessed differently by everybody he met, he would have no social status at all" (Marshall 1977: 198 quoted in Paul et al. 2014: 8) . Approval of two other circles-evolving states enjoying different status -is required.
The second circle is composed of actors already enjoying the sought after status, that is to say in this case the second circle is composed of other great powers. When a country is believed to perform the role(s) and to satisfy most of the great power criteria, it is recognised by other great powers as a member of their "club". At its beginning, "the great power system was rather like a British gentleman's club, with admission controlled by the existing members. If established great powers begin to treat another state as one of their members, that country ipso facto became a great power" (Scott 2006: 119) . The decision to co-opt new members by already recognised great powers is rather a subjective process than an objective one based only on material criteria. Co-optation, indeed, means, more or less, being the same, having the same characteristics as others have. Actors who are already members of a group impose their views, goals and behaviours and potential members have to follow these rules in order to become members of the group. Recognition/co-optation by the second circle is important: high status group members (other great powers) are more prominent and influential in their opinion and their help is sought more often; their actions and behaviours draw particular attention and their positions taken and policies carry more weight than those of other actors (de Waal, Gregg and Lammers 2015: 447) . This step is a good achievement but is only partial because the group of great powers is a small sample of actors (normally no more than ten countries).
Of course, being recognised by great powers as being a pre-condition of great power legitimacy, it still needs a stronger stimulus. It needs support (recognition) from the remaining actors. To achieve full recognition, a country needs to see its status recognised by a bigger group, that is to say the international community.
The international community is the third and last circle. (Lindemann 2010) . The recognition denial is the gap between the claimed frame and the frame perceived by others. There is recognition denial when the image a state has of itself is higher than the image given back by others. The more important the gap is, the stronger feelings of frustration (and even humiliation) are (Lindemann 2010: 51) . Status denial tends to lead to an increase of challenges and what is perceived as provocation by the state facing status uncertainty as the fear factor included in great power status is eroding. In this sense, challenges are a symbolic demand of a proof of great power. To avoid status denial,
the state must "demonstrate their possession of qualities that warrant their acceptance" (Lebow 2010: 94) . If the challenged great power responds to the challenge(s) in a satisfying manner, the challenges might stop.
But if not, then challenges might continue until the imposture is revealed to all. Hence the need to make the second and third circles to see the state as a great power. The shape of actions to take can differ, but it "often requires publicly incurring some cost or risk, often by participating etc.) In this scenario, the situation can quickly become difficult. The challenged state will have to decide between attempting to punish the challenger to send an appropriate status signal and thus taking the risk to publicly fail because it has no more capabilities to do so. Or, the state can decide not to react to the challenge, making clear that the second and third circles were right to interpret its signals as inappropriate for a great power. The dilemma for states facing status uncertainty is the following: to maintain great power status, the challenger has to be punished severely (and decisively), but taking the decision to go to war can lead to a more damaging consequence in the case of a failure: a great power defeated militarily by a weaker actor would be very embarrassing. 
Methodology

Research design
The research instrument I use to analyse the declassified documents is discourse analysis. Discourse analysis is defined as the "qualitative and interpretative recovery of meaning from the language that actors use to describe and understand social phenomena" (Abdelal et al. 2009: 6) .
It is in speeches and in written documents that perceptions of a given situation can be found. For example, if it appears that status and prestige considerations are the cause of the decision to go to war, then words or idioms expressing these ideas should be found in documents before the decision to go to war is taken. However, there are two major risks in applying the discourse analysis method to leaders' discourses and writings.
The first one is: how can we be sure that what is said or written by leaders is the truth? This risk has been highlighted by Paul Saurette (2007) , and many others. Saurette studied the motives George Bush had when he took the decision to invade Iraq in 2003. They were basing their analyses on public discourses Bush made. When studying public discourses, it must be taken into account that these discourses are addressed to domestic public opinion as well as to international public opinion, while books written by politicians are often used as justification a posteriori. I mitigate this risk in the data collection section, where I explain that I have selected mainly declassified documents as sources.
Declassified documents enable us to avoid the first risk because they
give us unique insights from the decision-making processes. As the documents were first designed to remain classified, there is less risk that what is written is untrue. The second risk is lying about "hidden interests".
How to affirm that what is assigned to emotions, identities, perceptions is not a useful mask to hide material interests? It is mitigated too by the use of declassified documents. Indeed, they give insights into the decisionmaking process leading to war and therefore, reveal what were thoughts and considerations of decision-makers at the time the decision was taken.
Maybe there are material interests but the documents would reveal that these material interests did not matter to them. These documents would also reveal whether decision-makers were conscious or not of the potential existence of material interests. Thatcher herself, which enables one to have a good idea on how she was perceiving the situation. As a result, these declassified documents give the opportunity to know what happened behind the stage; as politicians do not always show the same considerations in public or in secrecy. In total 1.840 documents related to the Falklands war have been declassified and published by the British government. I actually limited myself to 328 of these documents as this paper is focused on the decision to go to war and not on what happened after the decision to respond was taken and the Navy received the order to sail to the South Atlantic. That is why I studied 2 For each document quoted, the reader will find the access link in the references.
Data collection
and analyzed only the documents from 10 May 1979 (the first declassified document was issued at this date) to 7 April 982 (debates at Parliament after the fleet departed). The documents used are classified as follows. 
Minutes and letters to Margaret Thatcher (MT) 43
Letters from MT to FCO 13
Reports on the situation in Argentina (on the economy, military and political situation, including Argentine press opinion) 17
Reports on discussions during Defense and Overseas Policy Committee 14
Reports from Ministry of Defense (MOD) to FCO 6
Public interventions of MT 6
FCO to Port Stainley 8
Letters from and to the governor of the Falklands 9
UK-US talks (excluding Haig's letters) 10
Reports on British ministers' visits to the Falklands 2
Reports to the Cabinet on the House of Common's position 2
Minutes to the Cabinet 7
Reports from the UK Embassy in Buenos Aires 31
MT messages to Head of States and vice-versa (including Ronald Reagan) 10
The hypothesis derived from the theoretical considerations I made previously is that great powers perceived as being in decline will respond to an aggression in their periphery by the use of the military force in order to maintain their state's status. If this hypothesis is correct, then discussions, speeches or notes evoking the place of the country on the international stage should be found within the declassified documents. The table below gives some examples of words and expressions (in bold) found in the declassified documents and linked to the theory previously explained. 
Case-study: Britain confronted in the Falklands' crisis
The analysis of the case-study of the British decision to go to war to reconquer the Falklands Islands aims to highlight the role status considerations and emotions played. This section is organised as follows: in the first part, I will recall elements that show Britain was facing great power status denial; then, in the second part and based on a qualitative analysis of declassified documents, I will highlight that status considerations and the desire to be recognised again as a great power played an important role in the British decision to go to war.
3 Only documents providing the most relevant examples will be directly quoted in this paper.
The remaining consequences of Suez: is Britain still legitimately claiming great power status?
From Suez to the Falklands: a succession of embarrassing military issues
The Suez fiasco in 1956 had a disastrous impact on British prestige. It also had an impact on how British citizens were seeing their country in the world and the place they thought Britain had on the international stage.
Before Suez, they were persuaded that their country was on the same level as the USA and the USSR: they thought they could compete with these states. After all the United Kingdom was the only European country involved from the beginning until the end of the Second World War and which successfully prevented a Nazi invasion (Marx 1993; Chassaigne 2009 ). After the end of WWII and despite its economic and industrial weaknesses, British diplomacy managed to create the impression that Britain was the only country which could bridge the differences between the US and the USSR: the UK was the country to which European countries should be close to in order to be connected to the US and the country to which the US should be linked to if they wanted to keep good relations with European states and also with the Soviets. But Suez changed everything; the image that the UK was a great power literally exploded. The British had to withdraw from the Suez Canal because of US and USSR pressures (Moscow even threatened to use nuclear weapons and Washington launched a financial offensive on the British Pound).
The Suez failed expeditions revealed two weaknesses Britain had: first, that its conventional forces were not adapted and were using outdated WWII equipment (Robbins 2013) . Secondly, without nuclear weapons, the UK was vulnerable to international pressures, especially from US and Soviet pressure.
Since the end of WII, Britain had seen its military capacities decrease. Britain had no nuclear weapons and a solution to change that was to buy nuclear systems from the US (the Polaris missiles for submarines). However, this solution appeared to be extremely costly and had consequences on the defence budget: the choice was either obtaining a deterrence capability or developing new programs (such as new ships for the Royal Navy). The decision to acquire Polaris missiles certainly did provide nuclear systems to the UK, at least in theory. There were persistent rumours that Britain was not an autonomous nuclear power because a Washington agreement and double-key procedure were limiting the use of British nuclear weapons:
"during the period from mid-1958 to March 1962, the British government would have had to secure US permission and authorization to arm the more reliable half of the V-Bombers" (Bronk 2014: 994) . Although these rumours have been denied by the British government, they were revived each time the British had to renew its systems. Conventional forces were not in a much better state. Since the 1960's Britain no longer had any modern aircraft carriers, which is quite problematic already for a great power, but it is even more problematic due to the image of the Royal Navy. Indeed, once the small British Garrison surrendered, they were humiliated by the Argentinians by being forced to lay on the ground, face on the ground and pictures were taken of them in this position. These pictures were released. This has been perceived as outrageous by the British, and
Thatcher mentioned this surrender in her speech at the House of Commons in which she emphasized that Royal Marines fought well "in the pure tradition" of British forces, and that ultimately, British armed forces will have the opportunity to take revenge on this humiliation (Thatcher 1982a ).
4
The Invincible class commissioned in 1980 (HMS Invincible, HMS Ark Royal, HMS Illustrious) weighed 22,000 tones and could carry only 22 STOVL aircraft. There are two types of aircraft carriers. The first one is called CATOBAR (catapulted assisted take-off barrier arrested recovery) and the second one is called STOVL (short take-off and vertical landing). The first type is considered more efficient because the aircrafts are launched by a steam catapult, they can carrier more armament and fuel. Whereas in the second type, aircrafts need to be lighter in order to be able to take off without help, therefore they can carry fewer munitions and fuel, their autonomy is less important. Possessing an aircraft carrier is considered as the ultimate display of a country's prestige and influence as the former head of the Royal Navy Admiral Sir Mark Stanhope said: "to put it simply, countries that aspire to strategic international influence have aircraft carriers" (BBC News 2012).
The symbolic (inappropriate) signal sent by decommissioning HMS Endurance: the UK further in retreat?
The Falklands issue raised concern about British resolve and commitment, because of the perceived gap between the official positions and the policies taken. Officially, the British position regarding the Falklands was no sovereignty transfer. In 1979 Thatcher annotated a report from Lord Carrington (the Foreign Minister), in which Carrington explained that, the best solution regarding the Falklands would be to proceed to a sovereignty transfer to Argentina. Next to the proposition, Thatcher annotated: "I could not possibly agree" (Carrington 1979) . However opposite signals were sent: in the meantime, the defense budget was decreased, the Royal Navy's tasks concentrated on hunting Soviet submarines in the North Atlantic, and HMS Endurance was decommissioned. HMS Endurance is an ice patrol ship, which has zero military value but was he only ship the Royal Navy permanently deployed in the Falklands, withdrawing and decommissioning it gave the impression that Britain was slowly retreating from this region. This decision raised some concerns among British politicians as recalled by Lord Carrington: "I remain concerned at the strength of public and Parliamentary opposition to HMS Endurance's withdrawal and at consequences for our position on the Falklands" (Carrington 1982) .
Stopping once for all humiliations and status denial; sending a strong signal to the world: "we are back in control"
Going to war for the Falklands to send an appropriate signal about
British great power status.
Sending the entire Royal Navy to the Falklands was a very risky decision.
Nothing could have predicted nor guaranteed a British success. The islands are 13,000 km from Britain and the nearest supply port and airport
Britain could use were at the Ascension islands, 6.000 km away from the Falklands, putting British strategic bombers out of range. Compared to the British, the Argentinians would operate at "only" 700 km from their bases.
Winning a war in these conditions would certainly restore British prestige in the world. It would first prove that Britain has the capacity to project its hard power far away, but demonstrated it also had the financial capacity and resolve to do so: it has to be remembered that the decision to send the Royal Navy had been taken very quickly. The islands were invaded on 2 April and the task force sailed three days later, on 5 April. As the UK was considered to be in decline, a victory in the Falklands would be considered as an astonishing achievement and would surely make the entire world forget about the Suez fiasco and restore the image of a strong and victorious United Kingdom.
It seems that British politicians were conscious that the Falklands crisis was the perfect opportunity to restore British credibility as a great power, that Britain has not changed and that this nation still has those sterling qualities which shine through our history". According to the definition of great power status, a great power has special duties and roles to perform. An expected duty from great powers is to manage the international system and thus to enforce the principles ruling it (Dafoe et al. 2014; Morris 2011) . Two arguments evoking the duties of great powers were used by Britain to justify their decision to go to war:
(1) defending the right of people to self-determination, and (2) protecting democracy from dictatorship. that we can to uphold that right". She also reminds us of this position in her autobiography (Thatcher 1993: 175-176) . Other British officials also referred to this position, such as the Falklands Governor Rex Hunt: "when he [the 5 See also her autobiography for another formulation of the same argument: "the significance of the Falklands was enormous, both for Britain's self-confidence and for our standing in the world. Since the Suez fiasco in 1956, the British Foreign policy had been one long retreat […] we had come to be seen by both friends and enemies as a nation, which lacked the will and the capability to defend its interests in peace, let alone in war. Victory in the Falklands changed that" (Thatcher 1993: 173-175) . The importance the Falklands crisis had is emphasized by the place Thatcher dedicated to it in her autobiography (40 pages in total). This suggests that there was a before and after watershed in the Falklands for Britain.
governor] left the Falklands, he said that the people were in tears. They do not want to be Argentinean" (Thatcher 1982a) . "we shall fight fiercely for the rights of the Falklanders who have been so loyal to everything in which you and we believe" (Thatcher 1982b ).
She went further in the assimilation of the Falklands crisis to the fight for freedom and democracy against dictatorship by making an analogy to Munich (1938) . In Munich, Neville Chamberlain sacrificed a large portion of Czechoslovakia to Germany to "save" the peace, or so he thought (Breuning 2007: 56 Recalling that this omission had led to the eventual "death of 45 million people, she identified the Argentine challenge as a repeat performance" (Young 1989: 72) and compared Galtieri to Hitler: "a common or garden dictator should rule over the Queen's subjects and prevail by fraud and violence? Not while I was Prime Minister" (Thatcher 1993: 181) .
Conclusion
This paper aimed to highlight the importance of an often disregarded argument to explain causes of war: considerations for status and prestige.
Evidence supporting the argument that Britain re-conquered the Falklands to save its great power status can be found in the declassified documents. This article also aimed to make studies based on analysis of primary sources more popular, or at least to make such studies be more widely considered in the academic field. Declassified documents are unique sources for researches as they provide authentic insights on decision-making processes. In this article, I have followed a qualitative discourse analysis path. It would be very interesting to continue the analysis of the Falklands case study, but next time by using these documents for a quantitative study. A quantitative study would enable us measure and to make comparisons between lexicon fields referring to prestige considerations, domestic politics concerns and strategic concerns, to ascertain which one is the most prominent.
